Simulated Trading for Maryland's Nitrogen Loadings in the Chesapeake Bay by Hanson, James C. & McConnell, Kenneth E.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 37/2 (October 2008) 211–226 
Copyright 2008 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 
Simulated Trading for Maryland’s 
Nitrogen Loadings in the Chesapeake Bay 
 
James C. Hanson and K.E. McConnell 
 
  We investigate nutrient trading for point and non-point sources for the Bay Restoration Fund 
in Maryland. We demonstrate how to use the proceeds from the tax revenue to mimic a market 
by trading high-cost upgrades of sewage treatment plants for low-cost winter cover crops. Un-
der an optimistic assumption about costs for non-point sources and naïve assumptions about 
the lag from planting cover crops to changes in nitrogen load, we calculate that 100 percent of 
abatement could be achieved at 56 percent of total costs, while in a pessimistic scenario, 100 
percent of abatement could be could be achieved at 83 percent of total costs. 
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Recent initiatives in air pollution policy have em-
phasized the efficiency of incentive-based mecha-
nisms for reducing pollution. The best example is 
the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading program, although 
there are a number of other incentive-based pro-
grams in the Clean Air Act and its amendments, 
including pollution permit trading programs for 
mercury and nitrous oxides.
1 
  The success of incentive-based mechanisms in 
reducing air pollution has led to their use in water 
pollution policy, where progress has been slower. 
The most familiar of these mechanisms is water 
pollution permit markets, which have consider-
able support from the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and various state government 
agencies.
2 Breetz et al. (2004) list over 70 such 
programs in various stages of development [see 
King and Kuch (2003) and Breetz et al. (2004) 
for summary data on these programs]. Unfortu-
nately, there have been only a limited number of 
voluntary trades to date, suggesting that there are 
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1 See Gayer and Horowitz (2005) for a comprehensive study of incen-
tive-based pollution control policies. 
2 The idea of nutrient trading for the Chesapeake Bay has circulated 
for some years. See the general ideas suggested by the Chesapeake Bay 
Program in its report “Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Fun-
damental Principles and Guidelines” at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/ 
trading.htm. 
barriers to be overcome if nutrient trading is go-
ing to be a viable water quality policy. 
  The requirements for water quality pollution 
trading are similar to those for air pollution per-
mit trading. The characteristics of buyers and 
sellers of permits must be determined. Some of 
the buyers or sellers must be polluters who have 
pollution caps on an individual or enterprise ba-
sis. The baseline levels of pollution emission of 
all sellers must be known. Finally, there must be 
active monitoring and enforcement. It is essential 
to have a public representative, such as a gov-
ernmental agency, representing the public interest 
to ensure that the contract terms of the trade are 
reasonable and are met. 
  We deal with water pollution from two sources: 
point and non-point. Measurement of emissions is 
feasible for point sources, such as a publicly 
owned treatment plant, but a significant challenge 
for non-point sources. The uncertainty that char-
acterizes non-point sources is all the greater be-
cause weather plays a major role in these emis-
sions. Because the link between conservation 
practices and nutrient abatement is uncertain, 
trading such practices for point source abatement 
is a gamble. Moreover, trading conservation prac-
tices instead of abatement hinders the ability of 
farms to seek more effective ways of nutrient 
abatement. 
  Much of the discussion of non-point source 
trading revolves around the notion of the trading 
ratio—the quantity of non-point source abatement 212    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
traded for point source abatement. The popular 
argument is that the trading ratio should be 
greater than one, to account for the greater un-
certainty of non-point source abatement (King 
and Kuch 2003). This conclusion is problematic, 
and stumbles on the distinction between abate-
ment uncertainty and emissions uncertainty. 
Shortle (1987) has observed that while increases 
in the abatement of non-point sources at the ex-
pense of point sources may increase the uncer-
tainty of abatement, they may reduce the uncer-
tainty of emissions. Malik, Letson, and Crutch-
field (1993) reach a more ambiguous conclusion, 
based on a more complex model.
3 Because ulti-
mately the public is most concerned about the 
damages caused by emissions (and is willing to 
incur costs to reduce it), it makes sense in policy 
decisions to focus on emissions, rather than abate-
ment. Toward that end, Shortle (1987) identifies a 
trading ratio of less than one as a tool for en-
couraging non-point source abatement and reduc-
ing the uncertainty of loadings. In a general 
model, Hennessy and Feng (2008) demonstrate 
the force of arguments for a trading ratio that fa-
vors non-point sources. 
  Although the idea of water pollution permit 
trading is old and the debate over its feasibility 
considerable [see King and Kuch (2003) for ref-
erences], there is very little empirical evidence on 
the potential gains from trade. It is obvious that 
the presence of heterogeneous abatement costs 
presents an opportunity to gain from trade. We 
contribute to the literature by providing evidence 
of the potential abatement costs for a modest 
trading system in Maryland. We also discuss a 
variety of agronomic and political forces that may 
make true markets for pollution permits difficult 
to establish. 
  We investigate nutrient trading for point and 
non-point sources in the specific policy presented 
by the Bay Restoration Fund (Maryland Senate 
Bill 320), widely known as the Flush Tax, in 
Maryland. The Flush Tax is expected to abate 
nitrogen emissions in the state by 7.5 million 
pounds, primarily from improvements in sewage 
treatment plants. To put that reduction in per-
spective, there was a flow of 56.7 million pounds 
of nitrogen into the Bay from all Maryland sources 
                                                                                    
3 See also Horan (2001), who argues for political forces as leading to 
higher trading ratios. 
such as agriculture, urban non-point, and sewage 
treatment plants in 2002. The 2020 strategy goals 
require a reduction of 20 million pounds, to 37.25 
million pounds. The 7.5 million pound reduction 
to be achieved by enacting the Flush Tax will ac-
complish one-third of the overall strategy reduc-
tion (Summers 2005). 
  We demonstrate the workings of an “adminis-
tered” trading system by maximizing abatement 
of nitrogen from Maryland publicly owned (sew-
age) treatment works (POTWs) and agricultural 
non-point sources subject to the restriction that 
costs not exceed the revenues generated by the 
Flush Tax. This administered trading system 
mimics a market for pollution permits by swap-
ping low cost upgrades of POTWs and low cost 
winter cover crops for higher cost upgrades of 
POTWs. Trading exploits heterogeneous abate-
ment costs for treatment plants and for agricul-
ture, creating substantial cost savings that could 
be used for increased abatement of nutrients. Un-
der an optimistic assumption about abatement 
costs for non-point sources, we calculate that 100 
percent of abatement could be achieved at 56 
percent of total costs, while in a pessimistic sce-
nario, 100 percent of abatement could be achieved 
at 83 percent of total costs. We also explore the 
role of uncertainty in determining the appropriate 
trading ratio between point and non-point sources 
of pollution to maximize improvements in water 
quality. 
  We label the scheme “administered” because it 
relies on observable abatement costs in the case 
of POTWs and on revealed costs for farms with 
cover crops. Consequently, such a scheme could 
presumably be managed by a government agency. 
Cost savings from a more sophisticated trading 
system, with a true market for loadings permits, 
would lead to greater cost savings because a true 
market would permit firms to seek out cost sav-
ings that would not be observable by government 
agencies. However, trading loadings permits has 
a number of significant barriers, including the 
chief problem of measuring loadings from non-
point sources. 
  While it is encouraging to identify the gains 
that would result from exploiting differences in 
abatement costs, the barriers to effective trading 
are extensive. We identify institutional and tech-
nical barriers that might prevent taking advantage 
of these opportunities. We also examine the change Hanson and McConnell  Simulated Trading for Maryland’s Nitrogen Loadings in the Chesapeake Bay   213 
 
 
in phosphorus loadings as a byproduct of nitro-
gen-based administrated trading decisions. 
 
 
The Maryland Flush Tax Legislation
4 
 
In May 2004, then Maryland Governor Robert 
Ehrlich signed the “Flush Tax” into law effective 
January 1, 2005. The Flush Tax, which has the 
objective of helping Maryland meet its obligation 
to reduce nutrient flow to the Bay, requires the 
owner or resident of each dwelling unit to pay an 
additional $7.50 per quarter on its water bill. An 
annual fee of $30 is levied on homeowners with 
septic systems. The fund has three purposes: 
 
▪  to upgrade sewage treatment plants from biological 
nutrient reduction (BNR) to enhanced nutrient re-
duction (ENR), which are both methods that reduce 
nutrients from sewage, 
▪  to expand the use of winter cover crops, 
▪  to fund the improvement of homeowner septic sys-
tems that are located in areas designated as critical 
in the Bay tributary strategy. 
 
  The Flush Tax will raise approximately $60 
million annually from users of POTWs. Another 
$12 million will be raised annually from the esti-
mated 420,000 private users of septic systems. Of 
the funds raised from septic system operators, 60 
percent will go to refitting failing septic systems 
in critical areas of the state, and the remaining 40 
percent to funding agricultural cover crops. There 
are concerns, however. The current levels of 
funding will cover only about 54 of the 66 
POTWs; an additional $161–$411 million will be 
needed to cover the remainder (Maryland Tribu-
tary Teams 2006). In addition, the open commit-
ment to fund the full costs of upgrades creates an 
adverse incentive for the plants to design a more 
expensive version of enhanced nutrient manage-
ment, perhaps exacerbating these funding short-
ages. 
  The vast majority of the funds will be used to 
upgrade sewage treatment plants. Specifically, 
funds will upgrade 66 major sewage treatment 
plants from biological nutrient reduction (BNR) 
to state-of-the-art enhanced nutrient reduction 
                                                                                    
4 For a good summary of Maryland’s point source strategy to upgrade 
wastewater treatment plants to state-of-the-art enhanced nutrient re-
moval (ENR), see Maryland Tributary Teams (2006). The description 
of the Flush Tax in this section is taken from that document. 
(ENR). With BNR, treated sewage has 8 mg/l of 
total nitrogen. With ENR, total nitrogen is low-
ered to 4 mg/l and phosphorus is reduced to 0.3 
mg/l. Sewage treatment plants are designated as 
major if they have at least 500,000 gallons of 
daily flow. All major POTWs are required to up-
grade. They account for 95 percent of the waste-
water flow from Maryland into the Bay. 
  An essential element of any trading system is a 
set of individual caps for some polluters. As part 
of the Flush Tax legislation, nitrogen and phos-
phorus caps (pounds per year) have been estab-
lished for each individual POTW, based on their 
daily discharges. The POTWs have two different 
estimates of flow for 2020 (projected flow and 
design flow), as shown in their County Water and 
Sewer Plan. Both estimates were approved by the 
Maryland Department of the Environment in 
April 2003. Design flow is larger than projected 
flow because it takes into account higher popula-
tion growth projections. The caps for nitrogen are 
equal to the product of the design flow and the 
ENR for nitrogen. 
  The implication of these two flows is that, in 
the short run, a POTW that upgrades to ENR will 
be operating under its nitrogen and phosphorus 
caps. But, as population grows in that municipal-
ity, reflecting the higher design flow, the POTW 
will increase its emissions of nitrogen and phos-
phorus until it meets its caps. At that point, it 
would be allowed to trade with another POTW 
that is operating under its caps or purchase an off-
set to its emissions. 
  The aggregate nitrogen cap for Maryland is the 
sum of the 66 POTWs in the state, or 9,145,817 
pounds per year of nitrogen (Table 1). Sewage 
treatment plants in Maryland are dominated by 
the Blue Plains sewage treatment plant (the Mary-
land portion not associated with Washington, 
D.C.) and the Back River sewage treatment plant 
(Baltimore City), which serve the two major 
population centers of the state. Table 1 shows the 
nitrogen released under BNR and ENR technolo-
gies and the costs of abatement for ENR for the 
two large POTWs and the remaining 64 smaller 
POTWs. The two large POTWs are responsible 
for 48 percent of the nitrogen released into the 
Chesapeake Bay from controllable Maryland 
sources, and the cost of converting them from 
BNR to ENR will absorb 64 percent of the ap-
propriated Flush Tax funds. 214    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Annual Loadings of Nitrogen, 2000, Nitrogen Cap Projected for 2020, and the Capital 
Costs of Upgrading 
  Annual Emissions of Nitrogen (lbs/year)   
  2000 Total Nitrogen Load  ENR N Cap  Capital Costs for ENR 
Blue Plains  3,367,631  2,066,108  $377,200,000 
Back River  4,529,473  2,192,803  $100,000,000 
64 smaller POTWs  8,681,877  4,886,906  $263,742,760 
TOTAL 16,578,981  9,145,817  $740,942,760 
Source: Maryland Tributary Teams (2006) and Levelev (2004). 
Note: Nitrogen cap projection based on enhanced nutrient reduction (ENR) with design flow. 
 
 
Administered Nutrient Trading Among 
POTWs and Cover Crops 
 
We explore administered nutrient trading, which 
is a more expansive version of nutrient trading 
than that allowed in the Flush Tax legislation but 
more restrictive than would emerge under a mar-
ket for nutrient emission permits. Administrative 
trading is motivated solely by differences in the 
average abatement costs from different sources. 
This program optimizes in the same sense that 
markets optimize—by allocating abatement to the 
least-cost alternatives. We begin by grouping the 
POTWs by trading areas (Table 2). We consider 
two levels of trading: watersheds and statewide, 
but a similar process could occur with tributaries. 
Blue Plains and Back River were excluded from 
the trading scheme because they were too large to 
trade with the smaller POTWs. They were as-
sumed to have been upgraded from BNR to ENR. 
Any gains from trading will be seen with the re-
maining 64 POTWs. 
  We compute the marginal abatement curves for 
nitrogen for the individual regions and for Mary-
land as a whole by using abatement from the 
cheapest source first, whether POTWs or cover 
crops. Within a given trading region, we mini-
mize the cost of meeting the aggregate regional 
cap based on the region’s marginal abatement 
schedule. The approach optimizes the same way 
trading in a market optimizes—the cheapest 
sources go first. However, this type of trading is 
not market-based, but administered by the gov-
ernment. Efficiencies can be achieved across en-
terprises, but not within enterprises, reflecting 
cost savings from heterogeneity but not from in-
centives. The greatest potential gains in cost sav-
ings, whether in a cap-and-trade program or in a 
market economy, come from the ability of a firm 
to seek new and cheaper ways of meeting goals. 
Frequently these cost savings involve responses 
that were not apparent when there was no oppor-
tunity to save money. For example, the costs of 
SO2 were considerably overestimated prior to the 
inception of the SO2 trading program.
5 While the 
static savings from trading that we uncover are al-
most certainly less than would be revealed under 
a system of full property rights for pollution per-
mits, understanding the workings of the adminis-
tered trading system would be essential to the im-
plementation of a broader system. 
  The costs of abating nitrogen from sewage 
treatment plants are based on the annualized capi-
tal costs. For each sewage treatment plant, we 
have the total capital cost of upgrading from BNR 
to ENR. Under the assumption that the plant op-
erates at projected flow, we calculate the annual 
reduction in nitrogen as a consequence of the up-
grade. The average annual abatement costs for the 
ith plant are 
 
(1)  /[ * ( ) ] pi i i bnr enr aac ACC q k k =− , 
 
where AACi is the annualized capital costs,
6 qi is 
projected flow of wastewater, and kenr and kbnr are 
the nitrogen concentrations for BNR and ENR (8 
mg/l and 4 mg/l, respectively). Note that this 
                                                                                    
5 See for example Schmalensee et al. (1998). 
6 Annualized under the assumption that the improvement will last 20 
years, with an interest rate of 5 percent. Hanson and McConnell  Simulated Trading for Maryland’s Nitrogen Loadings in the Chesapeake Bay   215 
 
 
Table 2. Sewage Treatment Plants (POTWs) in Watersheds, and Tributaries 
Maryland State: 64 POTWs (excluding Blue Plains and Back River) 
Watershed Tributary 
Eastern Shore watershed (19 POTWs)  Choptank tributary (3 POTWs) 
  Lower Eastern Shore tributary (9 POTWs) 
  Upper Eastern Shore tributary (7 POTWs) 
Potomac River watershed (23 POTWs)  Lower Potomac River tributary (5 POTWs) 
  Middle Potomac River tributary (4 POTWs) 
  Upper Potomac River tributary (14 POTWs) 
Western Shore watershed (15 POTWs)  Lower Western Shore tributary (6 POTWs) 
  Upper Western Shore tributary (5 POTWs) 
  Patapsco/Back River tributary (4 POTWs) 
Patuxent River watershed (7 POTWs)  Patuxent River tributary (7 POTWs) 
 
 
abatement cost equation assumes that the baseline 
for all firms is BNR, a condition that is currently 
not true.
7 This calculation of costs omits variable 
costs, which are believed to be small but not zero. 
We have written the cost equation for abatement 
from sewage treatment plants assuming that there 
is no randomness in the nitrogen emissions. There 
is typically randomness because of weather or 
surges in loads, but these effects are small in com-
parison with randomness from non-point sources. 
  The costs for farms of abating nitrogen using 
cover crops are based on the payment made to 
induce farms to adopt cover crops, as well as the 
efficiency of the cover crops in abating nitrogen. 
We estimate the costs by considering the effi-
ciency of cover crops to reduce nitrogen emis-
sions, conditional on the type of cultivation prac-
ticed. That is, a nitrogen cover crop will induce 
more abatement on high-tillage corn than on low-
tillage corn, because the high-tillage crop begins 
with higher emissions. Given the institutional 
structure of paying a single price to all farmers 
enrolled, the abatement costs are calculated as 
follows: 
 
(2)  0 /( * ) ni ef i aac AP k e = , 
                                                                                    
7 Currently over half of the POTWs are not even at BNR. Some of 
these upgrades are costly, especially for small communities. There are 
good opportunities for cost-saving arbitrage for these upgrades too. 
where aacni is the average abatement cost for the 
ith non-point enterprise, AP is the adoption price 
per acre paid to farms to plant cover crops, kef is 
the proportional efficiency of cover crops in re-
ducing nitrogen, and ei0 is the baseline level of 
emissions per acre for the ith enterprise. The 
baseline level of emissions is idiosyncratic, de-
pending on such factors as the cultivation meth-
ods, previous crops grown, soil type, slope, and 
weather. In particular, the baseline will be lower 
for farms that have pursued environmentally sound 
cultivation techniques. As equation (2) indicates, 
the abatement costs will be higher for farms that 
have lower baseline levels of nitrogen loadings, 
and those farms as a consequence will be less 
likely to enroll in cover crop programs when the 
programs are managed on the basis of minimizing 
abatement costs. In Maryland the adoption price 
has been determined by political forces, the state 
of the budget, and the immediacy of the environ-
mental issues. 
  Heterogeneity of abatement costs from cover 
crops stems from variation in the efficiency pa-
rameter kef and the baseline level of nitrogen loss, 
ei0. Early planting of cover crops yields efficien-
cies of 30 percent. Late planting (after October 1) 
reduces efficiency to 15 percent. Cover crops are 
more cost-effective when they follow a high-till-
age crop, the baseline. For example, an acre of 
high-tillage corn may lose 20 pounds of nitrogen 
to groundwater. With the application of an early 216    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
planted cover crop (30 percent efficiency), the 
reduction in nitrogen lost is 6 pounds. In com-
parison, a conservation tillage crop of corn may 
lose only 15 pounds of nitrogen. Early planted 
cover crops (30 percent efficiency) reduce nitro-
gen losses by only 4.5 pounds per acre.
8 
  The current approach to allocating funds for 
adoption of cover crops and other green practices 
fails to achieve least cost for nitrogen abatement. 
However, if farms were to adopt cover crops 
based on the costs of abating nitrogen, then of-
fering a fixed price for enrollment would generate 
a least-cost approach to allocating funds to this 
practice. When farms have heterogeneous costs of 
adoption, as they almost certainly do, then we 
expect that AP would cover the adoption costs of 
the highest cost abater, giving the more efficient 
abaters surplus from the constant price. In Figure 
1, “MAC” represents the marginal abatement cost 
from planting cover crops. It is created by ranking 
the farms from lowest to highest in terms of the 
costs of abating nitrogen with cover crops. (In 
practice this curve would be a step function 
where the horizontal length of the step would be 
the farm’s contribution to nitrogen reduction.) 
The marginal farm is just induced to plant cover 
crops at the price AP,  bringing the quantity of 
abatement to N.  Other farms incur costs below 
AP. The net gain to farmers from this method of 
subsidizing cover crops and abating nitrogen is 
the area ONM. 
  In the practice of subsidizing cover crops in 
Maryland and other states, however, farms sign 
up for cover crops based on the cost of cultivating 
the cover crops, not the cost of nitrogen abate-
ment. For example, two farms that are identical 
except that one has a baseline of high-till corn 
and the other low-till corn would be equally eli-
gible, though the high-till corn farm would have 
the lower cost in nitrogen reduction. Hence, the 
actual practice of allocating funds to cover crops 
does not yield a least-cost approach to abatement. 
Hence the application of this incentive-based 
mechanism requires that farms be ranked in terms 
of the reductions in nitrogen loadings. Informa-
tion for such a ranking is inherent in the data 
                                                                                    
8 Cover crop acreages and nitrogen loading data were taken from the 
Chesapeake Bay Program Watershed Model Output Data, Detailed 
Loads and Land Use Acreage, Edge Stream Load Land (see http:// 
www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/waterqualitycriteria/Loads_Landuse_De











sources we use to calculate baseline nitrogen load-
ings by farm. 
  Our method of calculating costs in equation (2) 
does a reasonable job of locating the most effi-
cient non-point sources first. That is, without es-
tablishing additional institutions, we can combine 
information on the cost of inducing the cover 
crop with agronomic information on the effec-
tiveness of the cover crop to provide an under-
standing of how to allocate the Flush Tax funds. 
Because we account for differences in baselines 
and differences in the location of farms, we have 
plausible estimates of the cost of abating nitrogen. 
As with point sources, greater savings can be 
achieved with incentive-based mechanisms for 
allocating funds. 
  As we explain below, there are some substan-
tial differences in how long it takes nitrogen to 
reach the Bay from non-point sources compared 
to point sources. In particular, the lag for point 
sources may be quite substantial, so that current 
abatement of non-point sources may take any-
where from weeks to years to have an impact on 
ambient water quality in the Bay. Hence one must 
be cautious in interpreting the results. 
 
 
Gains from Trading 
 
The fundamentals of trading are presented in Fig-
ure 2, which gives the incremental abatement cost 
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Figure 2. Efficient Allocation of Nitrogen Abatement Between Point Sources and Cover Crops, 
Traded Within Maryland 
Note: $30 per acre and 30 percent reduction of nitrogen. 
 
 
cover crop abatement moving from right to left 
and POTW abatement left to right. The total 
abatement target equals the amount of abatement 
that would be achieved by the POTWs if they all 
upgraded to ENR. In the case presented here—30 
percent efficiency and $30 per acre for the pay-
ment (see equation 2)—there is little variation in 
the abatement cost from cover crops because the 
high cost non-point sources are not relevant. The 
costs of abating the quantity on the horizontal 
axis are minimized when the incremental costs 
from the two different sources are equal, where 
the marginal abatement cost curves intersect. 
  There are greater differences in cost per pound 
of nitrogen abatement for POTWs than for cover 
crops (Figure 2). If there were no trading and all 
64 POTWs were upgraded to ENR, then the 
abatement in nitrogen would be 3,763,387 pounds 
(Table 3). When trading is allowed, with the goal 
of abating the same amount of nitrogen, then only 
16 of the least expensive POTWs are built and 
they abate 2,948,726 pounds of nitrogen. The 
remainder of the abatement (814,661 pounds) is 
achieved by planting 111,419 acres of cover 
crops. Instead of spending $263,742,760 on 
POTWs, only $136,600,000 is spent on the 16 
POTWs. The cost of planting cover crops is 
$49,951,337. The total cost or abatement under 
this shared reduction in loading of nitrogen is 
$186,551,337, or 71 percent of the allocated 
amount from the Flush Tax legislation, saving 
over $77 million. 
  Trading can be limited to within each of the 
four major watersheds in Maryland. The goal is 
still 3,763,387 pounds of abatement, but expen-
sive POTWs can be traded for cover crops only 
within the respective watershed (Table 4). The 
differences among watersheds are dramatic. 
  The POTWs of the Eastern Shore and Potomac 
watersheds are smaller in terms of average 
abatement per POTW. In these two more rural 
watersheds, there is a greater potential of nitrogen 
abatement from the use of cover crops than from 
upgrading POTWs from BNR to ENR (Figures 3 218    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 3. Efficient Allocation of Nitrogen Abatement Between Point Sources and Cover Crops  
  Total Available  Efficient Combinations 
% of Efficient 
Combinations    







No. of units  64 POTWs  1,165,079 ac  16 POTWs  111,419 ac  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Abatement (lbs)  3,763,387  6,271,486  2,948,726  814,661  78%  22%  3,763,387  100% 
Capital cost ($)  $263,742,760  n/a  $136,600,000  $49,951,337  n/a  n/a  $186,551,337  71% 
Avg. annual cost/lb  n/a  n/a  3.72  4.92  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Note: At $30/acre and 30 percent reduction efficiency, statewide trading. 
 
 
and 4). It is feasible to plant almost one million 
acres of cover crops in these two watersheds. 
Under trading for the Eastern Shore watershed, 
only one POTW is upgraded. Seventy-six percent 
of the Eastern Shore’s abatement goal is met by 
planting cover crops. For the Potomac watershed, 
six of 23 possible POTWs are upgraded to reach 
75 percent of its abatement goals, with 25 percent 
of the abatement coming from the use of cover 
crops. The cost savings for these two watersheds, 
by allowing trading, are significant. One hundred 
percent of the abatement goals for the Eastern 
Shore and Potomac watersheds can be met at only 
39 percent and 64 percent of the costs, respec-
tively. 
  The POTWs of the Western Shore and Patux-
ent drain into more urban watersheds. In these 
watersheds, there is a greater potential of nitrogen 
abatement from upgrading POTWs from BNR to 
ENR than from the use of cover crops (Figures 5 
and 6). As compared to the one million acres of 
cover crops in the two rural watersheds, it is only 
possible to plant approximately 200,000 acres of 
cover crops in these watersheds. One-third of 15 
POTWs are upgraded in the Western Shore wa-
tershed to meet 87 percent of its abatement goals, 
and 4 of 7 POTWs are upgraded in the Patuxent 
watershed to meet 92 percent of its goals. Be-
cause these two watersheds are more urban, the 
cost savings are not as dramatic as with the East-
ern Shore. However, 100 percent of the abate-
ment goals for the Western Shore and Patuxent 
watersheds can be met at 86 percent and 84 per-
cent of the costs, respectively. 
  When trading is allowed across the state (Table 
3) or restricted to only within the four watersheds 
(Table 4), the cost savings are identical at 71 per-
cent of the cost when all POTWs are upgraded. 
This would suggest that trading could be pursued 
through the watershed level. In this way, the 
problems associated with “hot spots” can be miti-
gated. Using the same logic, trading within the 10 
tributaries in Maryland could be examined. The 
problems of “hot spots” would be further re-
duced, but whether the cost savings would be as 




Accounting for differences in abatement costs 
demonstrates the savings available with the kind 
of administered trading considered here. Given 
that this is not a true incentive-based mechanism, 
it is possible that much higher savings would be 
available. Even so, various technical issues create 
barriers even to the simple arbitraging that we 
have discussed. We explore some of the more 
salient issues that would arise in the implementa-
tion of an administered trading scheme. These is-
sues are not exhaustive, but they reveal the com-
plexity of the problem. 
 
Uncertainty about Abatement Costs with Cover 
Crops 
 
In our research, we assumed two different costs 
of subsidies to farmers to plant cover crops—$30 
per acre and $20 per acre—and two different lev-
els of effectiveness from the cover crops—15 
percent and 30 percent abatement in nitrogen. We 
also assume a 20 percent charge in administering 
this program, which is likely to be by the state 
department of agriculture and its soil conserva-
tion districts or by the state natural resource and 
conservation service. Cover crop abatement ef-
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ES Point Source ES Cover Crops, $30, 30%
 
Figure 3. Efficient Allocation of Nitrogen Abatement Between Point Sources and Cover Crops, 
Traded Within the Eastern Shore Watershed 


























Potomac Point Source Potomac Cover Crops, $30, 30%
 
Figure 4. Efficient Allocation of Nitrogen Abatement Between Point Sources and Cover Crops, 
Traded Within the Potomac Watershed 



























Western Shore Point Source WS Cover Crops, $30, 30%
 
Figure 5. Efficient Allocation of Nitrogen Abatement Between Point Sources and Cover Crops, 
Traded Within the Western Shore Watershed 






























Pax Cover Crops, $30, 30% Pax Point Source
 
Figure 6. Efficient Allocation of Nitrogen Abatement Between Point Sources and Cover Crops, 
Traded Within the Patuxent Watershed 
Note: $30 per acre and 30 percent reduction of nitrogen.  222    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
land, it is assumed that cover crops planted before 
October 1 have a 30 percent abatement 
effectiveness and those planted after that date, 15 
percent. 
  The relative attractiveness of cover crops ver-
sus improvements in POTWs depends on farm-
ers’ responses to these subsidies and how quickly 
they can get the cover crop planted (Table 5). The 
most optimistic assumption about farmer behavior 
($20 per acre and 30 percent nitrogen reduction 
from early planting) leads to only 9 POTWs be-
ing upgraded and 330,278 acres of cover crops, 
with savings of 44 percent. The most pessimistic 
assumption about farmer behavior ($30 per acre 
and 15 percent nitrogen reduction from late plant-
ing) leads to 32 POTWs being upgraded and only 
89,763 acres of cover crops, for a 17 percent cost 
savings. These differences are further complicated 
by differences in implementations for POTW up-
grades and cover crop adoption. The upgrade is a 
one-time permanent decision and the cover crop 
adoption decision is annual. 
  The costs of abatement from cover crops have 
been computed on the assumption that cover crop 
plantings result in reductions in loadings as rap-
idly as POTW abatement. One of the biggest dif-
ferences between point and non-point emissions 
is the lag between changes in abatement and 
changes in loadings to the Bay (see Phillips and 
Lindsey 2003). Increases and decreases in point 
source emissions are immediately transformed to 
corresponding changes in nitrogen in the Bay and 
its tributaries. Depending on the means of trans-
port of non-point emissions, non-point source 
abatement can take anywhere from days to dec-
ades to impact the Bay. When nitrogen is part of 
surface water runoff, the lag time can be quite 
short. Nitrogen that is transported in groundwater 
may take up to 50 years to reach the Bay, with a 
median lag of about 11 years.
9 Given that about 
half of the nitrogen reaches the Bay through 
groundwater contribution to streams, this lag needs 
to be considered in understanding choices be-





                                                                                    




In trading at the most aggregated level of Mary-
land, we implicitly assume uniform mixing of 
pollutants. Naturally, the broader the trading re-
gion the greater will be the gains from trading. 
However, increasing the size of the trading region 
enhances the potential for “hot spots,” i.e., 
smaller areas that experience an increase in nitro-
gen pollution. 
  Table 3 shows the gains from trading expensive 
upgrades of POTWs for cover crops on a state-
wide basis. The statewide goal of abating 
3,763,387 pounds of nitrogen is met with reduc-
tions in costs of 29 percent. However, there are 
differences in abatements by watershed (not 
shown). Specifically, abatement through this trad-
ing scheme as compared to what would have 
occurred with the enactment of the Flush Tax 
would be 77 percent, 103 percent, 109 percent, 
and 95 percent of the abatement goals for the 
Eastern Shore, Patuxent, Potomac, and Western 
Shore watersheds, respectively. The Eastern Shore 
and Western Shore watersheds will actually ex-
perience a relative increase in nitrogen pollution 
(or a smaller level of abatement) compared to 
what would have occurred with the Flush Tax. As 
shown in Table 4, this problem can be rectified 
by trading on a watershed basis, with only slight 
increases in costs. However, that could lead to in-
equities among tributaries. And, if trading oc-
curred within tributaries, then individual cities or 





When the goal is to maximize nitrogen reduction 
given the funding from the Flush Tax, phospho-
rus reductions suffer. Phosphorus loadings also 
contribute to the over-nutrification of the Bay. 
Hence one of the advantages of an “engineering 
fix” such as ENR or BNR is that systems can be 
designed to abate several nutrients at once, such 
as nitrogen and phosphorus. It may be expensive 
but it is feasible. The disadvantage of a “biologi-
cal fix” is that it may not be feasible to abate 
more than one nutrient. Cover crops are a good 
example. They work well to inexpensively reduce 
nitrogen pollution, but not so well in reducing 
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  With 100 percent enactment of the Flush Tax 
legislation—that is, upgrading all POTWs—phos-
phorus would be abated by 658,593 pounds. Us-
ing trades, based on nitrogen abatement as illus-
trated in Table 3, the amount of phosphorus 
abated would be only 533,200 pounds. The 16 
POTWs that are upgraded abate 516,028 pounds 
of phosphorus, but the 111,419 acres of cover 
crops are not as effective, abating only 17,172 
pounds of phosphorus. 
  The disproportionate reduction in nitrogen and 
phosphorus loadings by POTWs and cover crops, 
combined with the differences in abatement costs, 
suggests that there are gains from trade, but some 
knowledge of the ecological marginal rate of sub-
stitution between nitrogen and phosphorus is re-
quired. That is, we would like to know the rate of 
substitution between nitrogen and phosphorus 
that keeps a key ecological goal, such as dis-
solved oxygen, constant. Assuming this rate to be 
constant over a small range, we could then con-
vert changes in phosphorus to changes in nitrogen 
that are ecologically neutral. This would permit 
us to factor in differential changes in phosphorus. 
 
Uncertainty about Loadings 
 
Uncertainty is an important aspect of the debate 
about point versus non-point sources and eventu-
ally brings up the idea of the trading ratio. The 
trading ratio is the number of units of non-point 
source abatement that must be provided for a one-
unit reduction in point sources. In the simplest of 
environments, where abatement of point and non-
point pollution provides certain reductions in am-
bient levels of pollution and there is uniform 
mixing of pollutants from different sources, the 
trading ratio should be one. The argument is then 
made that, because of the greater uncertainty in 
abating non-point sources, trading ratios should 
be greater than one. For example, a trading ratio 
of two means that abating two pounds of nitrogen 
from a non-point source is equal to abating one 
pound of nitrogen from a point source. King and 
Kuch (2003) suggest that the typical trading ratio 
lies between one and four. Horan (2001) gives 
trading ratios between one and three. The effect 
of a trading ratio greater than one is to make non-
point sources more expensive and, other things 
equal, to restrict their use. 
  This argument appears solid only because it is 
based on what happens to abatement, not emis-
sions. To recognize the difficulty with this argu-
ment, we focus on the primary task of Bay pollu-
tion control, that is, reduction in emissions of 
nutrients. Due to weather, emissions are likely to 
be random. We characterize randomness by dis-
crete increases or decreases in emissions. By defi-
nition, these increases and decreases cancel out 
over time.
10 
  In the situation where a policy attempts to re-
duce the random variation of emissions as well as 
mean emissions, control measures should adopt a 
trading ratio to encourage the abatement of the 
more random emissions. In the case of the Chesa-
peake Bay, emissions are more random from non-
point sources than point sources. This follows as 
long as greater abatement of non-point sources 
reduces the randomness of non-point emissions, 
an assumption that is reasonable.
11 When re-
sources are devoted to abating non-point emis-
sions, there are two gains: lower mean emissions 
and less randomness. With point source abate-
ment, we get only reductions in mean emissions. 
Reductions in point source randomness is un-
changed since it is defined as “relatively certain.” 
However, more important, the randomness from 
non-point sources is left unchanged. 
  Consider non-point nutrient emissions from 
1,000 acres of agricultural land. Each acre emits 
an average of 8 pounds of nitrogen, with an equal 
chance of emitting 4 or 12 pounds. The emissions 
from this farm will range from 4,000 to 12,000 
pounds, with a mean of 8,000 pounds. A local 
POTW has emissions of 15,000 pounds with little 
randomness. Abatement costs are similar for the 
POTW and cover crops. Total emissions from 
these two sources are 23,000 pounds, with a 
range of from 19,000 to 27,000 pounds. When 
cover crops are used for abatement, the loss per 
acre is reduced to 5 pounds, but with equal likeli-
hood the loss can be 2.5 or 7.5 pounds. The load-
ings from this farm will now range from 2,500 to 
7,500 pounds, with a mean of 5,000 pounds. To-
tal emissions from the two sources are 20,000, 
                                                                                    
10 We view the problem ex ante but compound the possible uncertain-
ties from different sources, such as weather, how well technology 
works, etc., into one uncertainty. Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield (1993) 
consider several sources of uncertainty. 
11 See Shortle (1987) for a mathematical proof of this assertion. A 
more general statement can be found in Hennessy and Feng (2008). Hanson and McConnell  Simulated Trading for Maryland’s Nitrogen Loadings in the Chesapeake Bay   225 
 
 
with a range of from 17,500 to 22,500 pounds. 
The use of cover crops has reduced the mean and 
range of emissions. 
  Suppose instead that we choose to abate 3,000 
pounds from the POTW. When the point source 
is adopted, we retain the randomness from non-
point sources. Total emissions from the two 
sources would now be 20,000, with a range of 
from 16,000 to 24,000 pounds. When the non-
point source is abated, we reduce both the mean 
and the randomness. So instead of advocating for 
a trading ratio of greater than one, as mentioned 
previously, a trading ratio of less than one is ac-
tually the preferred option to improving water 
quality.
12 
  The arguments about the correct trading ratio 
hinge on the convexity of the damage function in 
loadings. The relevance of convexity depends on 
the scale of the trades, which depends on the ap-
plication. To begin with, nutrient flow to the Bay 
is made up of human-induced emissions and natu-
ral contributions. The current Chesapeake Bay 
agreement calls for reducing nitrogen from 285 
million pounds to 175 million pounds. In this 
context, the difference in emissions caused by un-
certain non-point source emissions is quite small. 
From Table 5, we see that the maximum abate-
ment from non-point sources is about 3 million 
pounds. Under current circumstances this amounts 
to about one percent of total current nitrogen 
emissions. This change in emissions represents an 
amount so small that curvature of abatement costs 
and—more important in this case—the convexity 
of the damage function, can hardly have a role in 
determining the exchange of non-point and point 
emission reductions. At least from the perspective 
of uncertainty in nutrient emissions in the Chesa-
peake Bay, there is no reason not to trade point 





In this paper we present evidence that under an 
administered trading system, where the responsi-
                                                                                    
12 This argument is predicated on the assumption that the randomness 
of the non-point system is viewed in aggregate. In other words, the 
randomness of the emissions from the previous crop (e.g., corn) is not 
separated from the randomness of the abatement associated with the 
cover crop (i.e., winter rye). When viewed over many years, the aggre-
gate view is more appropriate.  
ble public agency selects lower cost abatement, 
there are in principle savings that could enhance 
Bay water quality. There are naturally barriers to 
these trades. These barriers are evident in the 
paucity of trading for nutrient abatement across 
the country. Reducing the barriers to administered 
trading, such as we have analyzed, can provide 
some gains. But the real gains, those that come 
from true incentive-based mechanisms, require 
substantial improvements in our scientific under-
standing of the connection between non-point 
source abatement and the reduction of nutrients to 
the Bay. Despite the difficulty in obtaining com-
plete understanding, it makes sense to continue to 
explore and develop opportunities to exploit dif-
ferences in abatement costs either through ad-
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